re: #170 No Malarkey!

Exactly, and Germany seethed at this imbalance as it sought its “place in the sun.”

Between Massie’s _Dreadnought_ and Tuchman’s _The Guns of August_ I got the distinct impression that German foreign policy post-Bismarck was a complete mess.

They believed they had a lot more influence than they did, generally acted bombastic and domineering in their statements, and horribly and totally misread both the French and British governments more than once. Plus the usual error of assuming other governments and leaders are going to react by doing nothing or reacting exactly as you predict they will react.

Beyond that the German naval policy was both folly* and something guaranteed to put the UK on the side of France in any conflict.

* - Folly in that Germany was never going to out build the Royal Navy. The UK government understood that Royal Navy superiority was vital to the UK’s existence. The German Navy was essentially a luxury for a land power and eventually the Army’s requirements for resources were going to be a hard stop on the navy’s demands.